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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SENECA FALLS SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. C-4954 
SENECA FALLS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
JANET AXELROD, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD G. BEYER of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
RANDY J. RAY, for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing CSEA's objections to a petition filed by the 
Seneca Falls Support Staff Association (SFSSA) seeking decertification of CSEA and 
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its own certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of support staff of the 
Seneca Falls Central School District (employer). 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's finding of fact and conclusions of law that: 
1. SFSSA was an employee organization on November 29, 1999 at the time of 
filing the instant^petition, ^ 
2. Committee for Change was one and the same as SFSSA. 
3. The names SFSSA and Committee for Change were interchangeable. 
4. SFSSA had an existence independent of NEA. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
A full exposition of the facts is recited in the ALJ's decision, thus we will confine 
ourselves to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions raised by CSEA. 
During the second week of November 1999, Billie Brinkeroff, Gary French,'Jack 
Rowles and Bill Jones met to discuss what they considered poor representation by 
CSEA. They scheduled a meeting with the entire support staff to raise the subject of . 
changing unions. They called themselves the Committee for Change. 
Ms. Brinkeroff, a former treasurer of the CSEA local, communicated with an 
NEA/NY UniServ representative, Michael E. Lynch, Jr., to attend the meeting of the 
support staff scheduled for November 15, 1999. 
Subsequent to the meeting held on November 15, 1999, Ms. Brinkeroff and 
others solicited the support staff to obtain the requisite number of signatures in support 
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of a decertification/certification petition to be filed by the "Seneca Falls Support Staff 
Association".1 
The petition to decertify CSEA and be certified as the bargaining representative 
for the support staff was filed by SFSSA with PERB on November 19, 1999 by Mr. 
Lynch as the-authorized representative of SFSSA. — P-
In January 2000, the employees elected three co-chairs for the organization. On 
February 9, 2000, the membership of SFSSA met and adopted the constitution that had 
been drafted by the organizing committee. 
On February 15, 2000, a hearing was held before the ALJ pursuant to 
§201,9(a)(2) of the Rules of Procedure. The ALJ rendered a decisibn on March 29, 
'"") 2000 dismissing CSEA's objections to the November 29, 1999 petition filed on behalf of 
SFSSA and holding that, as directed by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director), an election be held by secret ballot among the 
employees in the at-issue unit. 
DISCUSSION 
CSEA's principle exceptions contend that SFSSA was not an employee 
organization on November 29, 1999 or, in the alternative, it was merely a "shell 
organization" for NEA. 
Section 201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) defines the 
term "employee organization" to mean "an organization of any kind having as its 
1Mr. Lynch had suggested to Ms. Brinkeroff that the Committee adopt the name 
.J "Seneca Falls Support Staff Association" for purposes of filing the petition with the 
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). As Mr. Lynch testified on cross-
examination, this was a generic-type title which described the unit to be affiliated with 
NEA/NY. 
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primary purpose the improvement of terms and conditions of employment of public 
employees . . . . " PERB's interpretation of this section of the Act is not without historical 
precedent as it has been applied to CSEA. In Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
v. PERB,2 the Appellate Division opined that "[w]hile PERB has found that PEF was 
created as a vehicle through whieh-NYSU^andSEIU could jointly supplant-GSEA . . . 
this is not inconsistent with its primary purpose of improving terms and conditions of 
employment for public employees. . . .this reasoning . . . supports a more liberal 
construction of the term 'employee organization'". 
It is apparent from the testimony of Ms. Brinkeroff that she and the other 
employees who formed the Committee for Change were dissatisfied with CSEA's 
representation of their interests and sought to be represented by a different-employee 
organization. The ALJ found SFSSA's witnesses to be credible in the face of conflicting 
testimony presented by CSEA.3 
266 AD2d 38, 12 PERB 1(7001, at 7005 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd in pertinent part, 46 
NY2d 1005, 12 PERB 1J7005 (1979) [CSEA objected to PEF's petition for decertification^ 
of CSEA as the exclusive bargaining representative for the state's PS&T unit and 
certification of PEF as its bargaining agent on the grounds, inter alia, that PEF was not 
an employee organization within the meaning of the Act.] See also State of New York, 
10 PERB 1(3093 (1977), where the Board initially found PEF to be an employee 
organization and dismissed CSEA's exceptions that PEF was created to supplant 
CSEA, that PEF was an organization even in the absence of current employee 
members, and that PEF would establish membership upon certification. 
3See New York City Transit Auth. v. PERB, 154 AD2d 680, 22 PERB 1(7036, at 
7058 (2d Dep't 1989), order modified, 154 AD2d 680, 22 PERB 1(7037 (2d Dep't 1989) 
["It is the duty of the administrative agency and not the court to weigh the evidence and 
resolve conflicting testimony".] See also DeVito v. Kinsella, 234 AD2d 640, 642, 29 
PERB 1(7021, at 7057(3d Dep't 1996). [It is not the function of a reviewing court to 
"reject testimony or substitute its judgment on matters of credibility"]. 
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Since Ms. Brinkeroff initiated the contact with NEA/NY through Mr. Lynch, and 
there was no evidence adduced to rebut that she and her fellow employees were acting 
independently of NEA/NY in the conduct of their business, we cannot conclude that 
either the Committee for Change or SFSSA was a shell organization for NEA/NY. 
— : GSBA^relmnce-on-ManhassehUnie-n-Free^GhoohDistne^is-misplaeediT^-heTe--'-
was no evidence adduced by CSEA that, apart from affiliation with NEA/NY, SFSSA 
would not be the exclusive support staff bargaining representative. Furthermore, CSEA 
failed to demonstrate that SFSSA would be controlled by NEA, thereby negating 
CSEA's reliance on Northport/East Northport UFSD.5 
Based on the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ is affirmed. 
412 PERB 1J3059 (1979), where the petitioning organization had entered into a 
coalition agreement with another employee organization, effectively abandoning part of 
the unit for which it sought to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, despite its 
representation to the employer and to PERB that it alone was the exclusive bargaining 
agent. 
527 PERB H3053 at 3114 (1994), motion for reconsideration denied, 27 PERB 
1J3061 (1994), confirmed sub norn. Boyle v. PERB, 28 PERB 1J7001 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 1995), where we held that an organization is not an employee organization 
entitled to certification "if the conduct of its affairs bearing upon the representation of 
unit employees is controlled or subject to the control of another entity which is not a 
party to the petition." (footnote omitted). See also Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. 
of the City of New York, 15 PERB H3041, motion for reconsideration denied, 15 PERB 
113060(1982). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the matter be remanded to the ALJ for 
further processing. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
(John T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF POUGHKEEPSIE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-20119 
POUGHKEEPSIE PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS'ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 596,1.A.F.F., AFL-CIO-CLC, 
Respondent. 
PETER C. McGINNIS, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN D. BERSON of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions filed, respectively, by 
the City of Poughkeepsie (City) and the Poughkeepsie Professional Fire Fighters' 
Association, Local 596, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC (Association), to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The City's charge alleges that the Association refused 
to negotiate in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it submitted for compulsory interest arbitration several demands for a 
^ 
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procedure under which determinations regarding benefits under General Municipal Law 
(GML) §207-a would be made.1 
FACTS 
The City alleges that the Association's proposal contains many nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation. 
The ALJ grouped several sections of the proposal for purposes of assessing 
negotiability. Sections numbered 13, 14, 19, 20 and 23 of the proposed procedure 
would establish a binding arbitration system for the resolution of disputes regarding an 
employee's initial and continuing eligibility for GML §207-a benefits. Sections 13 and 14 
involve initial eligibility determinations. Sections 19, 20 and 23 involve disputes arising 
-^ from a termination of GML §207-a benefits. Relying upon our decision in City of 
Watertown (hereinafter Watertown),2 the ALJ held that arbitration to resolve disputes 
about an employee's eligibility for benefits under GML §207-a is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
Sections 7,11,12,17 and 18 establish the fire chief as the one and only City 
agent responsible for making initial and continuing eligibility determinations. The ALJ 
held these sections to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation because the City has a 
managerial prerogative to appoint its own agent for purposes of making the eligibility 
1GML §207-a provides for the payment of salary and medical benefits to fire fighters 
who are injured or taken ill in the performance of their duties. 
230 PERB 1J3072 (1997), confirmed, 31 PERB fl7013 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 
J 1998), rev'd, 263 AD2d 797, 32 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dep't 1999), motion for leave to appeal 
granted, 94 NY2d 751 (1999), 33 PERB ff7003, rev'd, NY2d , 2000 NY Lexis 902 
(2000). 
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determinations which would then be subject to review under the proposed arbitration 
procedure. According to the ALJ, making the fire chief the one and only person who 
could act on behalf of the City deprived the City of its managerial prerogative. 
Section 6 of the proposal, reiterating the City's right under GML §207-a to require 
an applicant for benefits to submit to medical examinations, was held mandatorily 
negotiable under City of Cohoes (hereinafter Cohoes).3 In relevant part, we held in 
Cohoes that demands by either party calling for the incorporation of statutory language 
embracing terms and conditions of employment are mandatorily negotiable absent 
prohibitive policy considerations. Section 10, which characterizes any leave from work 
taken by an employee found eligible for GML §207-a benefits as GML §207-a leave, 
was found mandatorily negotiable for the same reason as section 6. Section 15 
: empowers the fire chief to periodically reassess an employee's eligibility for benefits as 
authorized by GML §207-a. According to the ALJ, he would have held section 15 
mandatorily negotiable because it again sought only to incorporate statutory language 
into a collective bargaining agreement. The ALJ held the demand nonmandatory, 
however, because, as with sections 7, 11, 12, 17, and 18, the reference to the fire chief 
as the only person responsible for that review interfered with the City's managerial 
prerogative. 
The City excepts to those parts of the ALJ's decision holding sections of the 
GML §207-a procedure to be mandatorily negotiable, its main objection being to the 
331 PERB H3020 (1998), appeal dismissed as premature, 31 PERB 117017 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany County 1998), confirmed, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1999), petition 
for review pending. 
^ 
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arbitration aspects of the procedure. It argues that the de novo arbitration proposed by 
the fire fighters to resolve disputes about an employee's initial and continuing eligibility 
for GML §207-a benefits is not mandatorily negotiable. The City urges us to either 
distinguish or reverse Watertown as to the negotiability of demands for arbitration of 
GML §207-a eligibility disputes. Regarding sections 6 and 10, the City argues that it 
should not be obligated to negotiate or arbitrate demands calling for the incorporation of 
statutory language into a contract. 
The Association excepts to the decision of the ALJ insofar as he held the 
sections referring to the fire chief to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. The 
Association argues that the ALJ assigned to conference the case incorrectly excluded 
from the record evidence which would have established that the parties reached an 
agreement designating the fire chiefas the City's agent for the relevant purposes after 
the charge was filed. According to the Association, those sections are no longer in 
dispute between the parties and the ALJ should not have made any determination 
regarding the negotiability of sections 7, 11, 12, 15, 17 or 18. The Association argues 
also that the ALJ's merits disposition of the negotiability of these several sections is 
incorrect. 
In response to the Association's cross-exceptions, the City argues that the 
Association should not be allowed to raise the existence of an agreement between the 
parties to any sections held nonmandatory by the ALJ because that issue was not 
raised in the Association's answer and it did not object to the conference ALJ's letter 
which sets forth the specific documents constituting the record upon which the case 
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would be decided. In any event, the City alleges that there never was any final 
agreement between the parties on the sections of the Association's proposal referring 
to the fire chief. 
For the reasons that follow, we reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the ALJ's 
decision.4 
DISCUSSION 
Demands 13. 14. 19. 20 and 23 
The Association's demands incorporate inseparable elements which render the 
proposals nonmandatory.5 
Demand 13 is the precursor to Demand 14. These demands would establish a 
de novo binding arbitration procedure to appeal the initial determination of GML §207-a 
eligibility. 
The City's denial of an employee's application for §207-a disability benefits falls 
within the authority vested exclusively within municipalities by the statute.6 The 
4We do not reach any determination, however, as to the negotiability of section 7. 
Section 7 was not in dispute between the parties according to the conference ALJ's final 
description of the scope of the parties'dispute. 
5City of Oneida PBA, 15 PERB 1J3096 (1982); CSEA, Inc., Niagara Chapter, 14 
PERB H3049 (1981); Amherst Police Club, Inc., 12PERB1J3071 (1979); City of Rochester, 
12 PERB 1J3010 (1979); Town of Haverstraw, 11 PERB 1J3109 (1978), confirmed in 
relevant part, sub norn. Town of Haverstraw v. PERB 1J7007 (Rockland County Sup. Ct. 
1979), a/fd, 75 AD2d 874,13 PERB U7006 (2d Dep't 1980); Pearl River Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 11 PERB 1J3085 (1978). 
) 6See DePoalo v. County of Schenectady, 200 AD2d 277,280 (3d Dep't 1994), aff'd, 
85 NY2d 527; Schenectady County Sheriff's Benevolent Ass'n v. McEvoy, 124 AD2d 911, 
912 (3d Dep't 1986); Brzostek v. City of Syracuse, AD2d , 697 NYS2d 423 (4th 
Dep't 1999). 
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Association has misinterpreted the import of our decision in Watertown where we held 
that the arbitration of disputes involving GML §207-c eligibility is mandatorily negotiable. 
In Watertown, the PBA demand acknowledged the City's right to make the initial 
determination and it merely requested that any such dispute over that initial 
determination be processed to arbitration pursuant to PERB's Voluntary Dispute 
Resolution Procedure. There was no reference in the demand, either express or 
implied, that there would be a de novo review of the City's initial determination. Rather, 
we determined the demand to be a substitute appeal procedure in order to avoid 
commencing an Article 78 proceeding. 
Here, however, the Association expressly demanded a de novo hearing of the 
City's initial determination. Black's Law Dictionary defines de novo as "[A]new; afresh; 
a second time."7 It is the inclusion of this language which renders nonmandatory the 
Association's demands for de novo review. Such demands are contrary to our decision 
in Watertown because we did not hold in Watertown that the union would be entitled to 
a de novo second hearing. We merely determined that the union's demand to appeal 
to arbitration disputes over the initial determination were mandatorily negotiable as a 
reasonable substitute for Article 78 review. 
Demand 19 is the precursor to Demands 20 and 23. These demands would 
establish a de novo binding arbitration procedure to appeal the termination of GML 
§207-a benefits. 
J 
7p. 483 (4th ed. 1968). 
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While the statute, GML §207-a, is devoid of an administrative procedure to 
implement the statutory scheme, the courts have provided guidance in its interpretation. 
The Court of Appeals has determined that the statute "does not trigger a hearing unless 
a firefighter on section 207-a status has brought that determination [the municipality's 
medical determination of fitness] into issue by the submission of a report by a personal 
r physician expressing a contrary opinion. Once evidence of continued total disability 
has been submitted . . .the [municipality's] order to report for duty may not be enforced, 
or benefits terminated, pending resolution of an administrative hearing, which itself is 
subject to review under CPLR article 78."8 
: The standard of review in an Article 78 is something other than de novo 
depending on the nature of the proceeding from which the municipality's determination 
was made. It is the City's right to make the determination of fitness which is inviolate 
and the forum to challenge that determination is incidental. Neither the statute nor case 
.;law;contemplates a de novo review procedure. 
: Our decision todayin no way affects our prior decision in Watertown regarding 
the ability of the parties to negotiate a review procedure which ends in arbitration. 
With respect to sections 6 and 10, the City would have us reverse that part of 
Cohoes concerning the negotiability of demands seeking the incorporation of statutory 
language into a collective bargaining agreement. As we decline to reverse Watertown, 
so do we decline to reverse Cohoes which the ALJ correctly applied to sections 6 and 
8Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF v. City of Cohoes, 2000 N.Y. 
Lexis 901. 
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Sections 11, 12, 15, 17 and 18 were held nonmandatory because the ALJ 
concluded they established the fire chief as the City's exclusive agent for making initial 
and continuing GML §207-a eligibility determinations. The Association argues in its 
exceptions that the hearing ALJ should not have ruled on the negotiability of these 
several demands because the conference ALJ incorrectly excluded evidence that the 
parties had reached an agreement about the role of the fire chief. 
Without deciding whether the conference ALJ should have resolved any issue as 
to whether and to what extent the parties had reached an agreement designating the 
fire chief as the City's agent, the conference ALJ, on written notice to the parties, ruled 
that the record would consist of certain documents only. The documents constituting 
the record for decision do not evidence any agreements having been reached by the 
parties in any relevant respect. No objection was made by either party to the ALJ's 
description of the record upon which a decision would issue. There having been no 
objection raised to the ALJ about the scope of the record, neither party may raise that 
issue to us for the first time on exceptions.9 As the ALJ who issued the decision did 
not have a record containing any evidence of any agreements regarding the role of the 
fire chief, the ALJ correctly reached the negotiability of those several demands. 
Had those several sections allowed the City to designate its agent for the 
purpose of making eligibility determinations, they would have been mandatorily 
negotiable. The ALJ, however, read the reference to the fire chief as limiting and not 
9Rules of Procedure, §§204.7(h)(2) and 212.3. See also State of New York 
(Workers' Compensation Bd.), 32 PERB 1J3017 (1999). 
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merely illustrative and that reading is a reasonable one for the reasons stated by the 
ALJ. We affirm, on that basis. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is, therefore, affirmed, in part, 
and reversed, in part. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Association immediately withdraw from 
interest arbitration its demands relating to sections 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 
and 23. The charge in all other respects must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 21,2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael) R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc'A. Abbott, Member 
<C •A 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, STEUBEN COUNTY 
L0CAL-85i-e0UNTY EMPLOYEES UNIT^ — 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20359 
COUNTY OF STEUBEN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BAISLEY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
FREDERICK H.AHERNS, JR., ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Steuben County Local 851, County 
Employees Unit (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing 
its improper practice charge alleging that the County of Steuben (County) violated 
§§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
failed to return two public health nurses, who had participated in protected activities, to 
their regular assignments following thirty-day disciplinary suspensions. 
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At the close of CSEA's case, the County moved that the charge be dismissed for 
failure to prove a prima facie case. The ALJ reserved on the motion and the County 
went forward with its case. 
The ALJ found that the two nurses, Linda Laker and Mary Ann Mitchell, had 
been involved in protected-act-ivi-tiesr-that-the County-was aware-of-their-protected-— 
activities but that the employees' reassignment upon their return from disciplinary 
suspensions was not motivated by anti-union animus. The ALJ denied the motion to 
dismiss but nonetheless dismissed the charge upon consideration of the record as a 
whole because she determined that the reassignment of Laker and Mitchell upon their 
return from disciplinary suspension was consistent with the treatment of other nurses 
not engaged in protected activities, was premised upon changes in the patients' needs 
and was based on legitimate business concerns. Further, the ALJ found that there was 
no evidence that Kathy Maine and Dawn Lindsay, the supervisors who decided upon 
the reassignments, were improperly motivated. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that there is sufficient evidence of 
anti-union animus on the part of the County, in general, and Maine and Lindsay, 
individually, to sustain the charge. CSEA further argues that the reasons given for the 
reassignments were pretextual and do not support the ALJ's conclusions. The County, 
in its response, supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Board - U-20359 -3 
FACTS 
At all times relevant to the instant charge, Laker and Mitchell were employed by 
the County as public health nurses. From July 1997 to February 1998, the County 
experienced a decrease in Public Health and Nursing Services (PHNS) patient 
caseload from 620 patients to 44QpatientST:Lln December 1997^Laker-and-Miteheir 
were selected by their co-workers to serve as representatives on a joint County-CSEA 
committee created to study staffing and scheduling issues resulting from the patient 
decrease. In January 1998, Laker was appointed by the CSEA local president Bonnie 
Sprague as the CSEA representative for the PHNS nurses. Laker and Mitchell also 
initiated a number of grievances on assignment and scheduling issues beginning in 
February 1998. 
During the months of December 1997 and January and February 1998, the 
committee met to attempt to resolve the issues associated with the decrease in patient 
caseload. No agreements were reached and the County instituted a seven-day work 
schedule and placed the PHNS nurse on-call status. Grievances and improper practice 
charges were filed by CSEA regarding these changes. The situation came to a head in 
February 1998, when Laker learned that Victoria Fuerst, PHNS Director, had sent a 
letter to the County Legislature, addressing the patient caseload decrease and outlining 
1The decrease was attributed to a change in federal medicaid reimbursement 
law. 
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her responses to it.2 Laker approached a CSEA labor relations specialist, Terri 
Menkiena, to draft a response letter. The letter, revised by the public health nurses, was 
signed by fourteen of them, including Laker and Mitchell, and sent to each member of 
the County Legislature. Attached to the letter was a list of the names of patients 
impaeted-by-FuerstrS ehanges^Laker^and Mitchell also-participated in a-Mareh 1^1998 
meeting with Menkiena, Sprague, CSEA vice-president Debbie Hall and County 
Administrator Dan O'Donnell. 
Thereafter, all fourteen nurses were questioned by the County Attorney, 
Frederick Aherns, O'Donnell and Fuerst regarding their involvement in the sending of 
the letter to County legislators.3 In mid-May, Notices of Discipline were served on Laker 
and Mitchell, resulting in their immediate suspension without pay for thirty days.4 CSEA 
has filed disciplinary grievances challenging the notices of discipline. The County is 
seeking the termination of Laker and Mitchell for their breach of patient confidentiality in 
divulging patient names. 
Laker and Mitchell returned to work from their suspensions on or about June 17, 
1998. Mitchell received a full caseload upon her return, but it was a caseload previously 
managed by another nurse. The caseload was more rural than her previous caseload, 
2Fuerst had created a seven-day work schedule, abolished three nurse positions 
and discontinued the use of part-time public health nurses to cover weekends. 
Apparently, the list of patient names was attached to the letter by Laker and with 
Mitchell's knowledge, but the record is not clear whether the other nurses signed the 
letter before or after the list was attached. 
4Both were given the opportunity to resign but chose not to do so. 
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resulting in more reimbursable travel mileage each month. Mitchell's supervisor, Maine, 
is a member of the bargaining unit. She testified that she made the decision to reassign 
Mitchell upon her return from suspension because she had given Mitchell's previous 
caseload to a nurse who had been having some difficulties with a more rural territory. 
Maine testified-that she^had made the deeision-to reassign-the other-nurse even before 
Mitchell's suspension but was waiting for the right opportunity to do so. When Mitchell 
left on her suspension, Maine assigned Mitchell's caseload to the other nurse and 
covered that nurse's caseload herself until Mitchell's return from suspension. She then 
reassigned the other nurse's caseload to Mitchell. 
Laker received patient assignments on a day-to-day basis until July 1,1998, 
when she was assigned the caseload of a nurse who had just resigned. Her travel 
mileage has not increased as a result of the reassignment. Lindsay, Laker's immediate 
supervisor, is a member of the CSEA bargaining unit. Lindsay testified that she alone 
made the decision to reassign Laker because when Laker was suspended, she 
reassigned Laker's caseload to another nurse for continuity of assignment. While Laker 
was suspended, Lindsay took over the other nurse's previous caseload. When Laker 
returned from her suspension, Lindsay began assigning new patients to her until the 
resignation of one of the public health nurses opened an area that could be covered by 
Laker. 
The County presented evidence that established that public health nurses had 
been involuntarily reassigned in the past when there had been a change in patient 
caseloads, a change in the needs of the patients in the geographic areas serviced by 
Board - U-20359 -6 
PHNS,5 an extended absence or leave by a public health nurse or an operational need, 
such as more direct supervision of a public health nurse, as was the case in Mitchell's 
reassignment. 
DISCUSSION 
GSEA-s eharge-is-limited to-the-easeload assignments of Laker^and-Mitchell——-^ 
upon their return from suspension. CSEA argues that Laker and Mitchell would not 
have been reassigned but for their protected activities. In order to establish improper 
motivation under §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, it must be proven that an employee 
had been engaged in protected activities and that the employer had knowledge of and 
acted because of those activities.6 If the charging party proves a prima facie case of 
improper motivation, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish that 
its actions were motivated by legitimate business reasons.7 The charging party can 
establish "[t]he existence of anti-union animus . . . by statements or by circumstantial 
evidence, which may be rebutted by presentation of legitimate business reasons for the 
5ln 1997, a portion of the area covered by the Corning office was transferred to 
the Bath office, resulting in the transfer of one nurse. In early 1998, Laker and another 
nurse were transferred from the Hornell office to the Bath office and two other nurses 
were transferred from Bath to Corning. 
6Town of Independence, 23 PERB |f3020 (1990). See also City of Salamanca, 
18 PERB 1J3012 (1985); City of Corning, 17 PERB ^3022 (1984); City of Albany, 4 
PERB H3056(1971). 
7
 City of Salamanca, supra; City of Albany, 3 PERB 1J4507, affd, 3 PERB fl3096 
(1970), confirmed in pertinent part, 36 AD2d 348, 4 PERB fl7008 (3d Dep't 1971), affd, 
29 NY2d 433, 5 PERB 1J7000 (1972). 
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actions taken, unless found to be pre-textual."8 Proof that the employer's stated reasons 
for its conduct are pretextual may constitute such circumstantial evidence.9 
The record evidences that Laker and Mitchell were engaged in protected 
activities and that both their immediate supervisors and the head of PHNS were aware 
ofthose-aetivities——— r — — --— 
CSEA points to Laker's involuntary assignment in January 1998 and the leveling 
of disciplinary charges against only Laker and Mitchell as evidence of the County's 
animus. However, Laker's reassignment was part of the reassignment of four public 
health nurses and the ALJ credited the legitimate business reasons for those 
reassignments testified to by Lindsay. Whatever the motivation for the County's 
decision to discipline Laker and Mitchell for the release of patient names,10 neither 
Lindsay nor Maine were part of that decision-making process and there is no evidence 
that Fuerst, O'Donnell or Aherns were involved in the reassignments of Laker and 
Mitchell. There is also no record evidence that Lindsay and Maine were motivated by 
anything other than caseload concerns and patient needs in their decisions to reassign 
Laker and Mitchell upon their return from their thirty-day suspensions. Finally, the 
aTown of Independence, supra, at 3038. See also Convention Ctr. Operating 
Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB 1J3067 (1995), confirmed, 234 
AD2d 640, 29 PERB 1J7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
9See City of Utica, 24 PERB fl3044 (1991); Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB 1J4605, 
a/fd, 28 PERB 1J3079 (1995). 
10Those disciplinary charges are the subject of disciplinary grievances filed by 
CSEA on behalf of Laker and Mitchell and are not before us. 
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reassignments were consistent with the County's practice of reassigning caseloads 
when a public health nurse was absent from work for an extended period of time or to 
otherwise meet PHNS operational needs. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the decision 
of-the ALJ-is-affirmed^ ~ — 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20478 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of counsel)* 
for Charging Party 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY LLC (JOHN F. O'REILLY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on motion by the City of Newburgh (City) pursuant to 
§212.3(h) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules)."1 The City asks us to review a ruling by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) reopening this 
1Section 212.3(h) of the Rules provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
All motions and rulings . . . shall be part of the record . . . and, unless 
expressly authorized by the board, shall not be appealed directly to the 
board, but shall be considered by the board whenever the case is 
submitted to it for decision. 
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case at the request of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), after it had been closed administratively.2 
We do not usually review rulings of the Director or an Administrative Law Judge 
until such time as all proceedings have been concluded.3 This policy is designed to 
prevent the-delay-inherentin-pieeemeal-review-and the potential prejudice resulting-to 
the parties therefrom. An interlocutory appeal from a ruling made in conjunction with the 
processing of a case is by our permission only pursuant to Rules §212.3(h). We have 
granted permission for an interlocutory appeal only in a few cases presenting 
extraordinary circumstances.4 Application of that standard has resulted in our rejecting 
most requests for permission to appeal. Similarly, we do not believe that this case 
presents circumstances so extraordinary as to warrant an interlocutory appeal. 
The rationale for the City's request for an interlocutory appeal is that it could and 
should be spared the expenditure of resources which might be incurred in litigating a 
2The matter had been placed on PERB's "hold calendar" until February 14, 2000. 
CSEA representatives failed to request a continuation of the "hold" in a timely fashion 
and the matter was, therefore, administratively closed by the Director. CSEA then 
requested that the Director reopen the matter, which he did over the objection of the 
City. 
3See Council 82, AFSCME, 32 PERB 1J3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch. Dist, 
32 PERB 1J3022 (1997); United Transp. Union, Local 1440, 31 PERB 1J3027 (1998); 
State of New York (Div. of Parole), 25 PERB P007 (1992). 
ASee New York State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB H3022 (1997); 
Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); Mt. Morris Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 26 PERB fl3085 (1983); County of Nassau, 22 PERB 113027(1989). 
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charge that should never have been reopened after it was closed.5 The City is no 
differently situated in this regard, however, than any other respondent which has a 
potentially dispositive defense to a charge or a charging party which claims that a 
favorable ruling on an interlocutory appeal will avoid the time and expense of a new 
-hearing-whieh-mightrbe neeessitated-by a reversal on appeal ofsome-aspeet-of an 
ALJ's final decision. Like the City here, those other respondents and charging parties 
have a claim that permission for interlocutory appeal might save them time and money.6 
We have not been receptive to such requests for interlocutory appeals from rulings 
adverse to such parties in the past and the circumstances of this case do not lend 
themselves to any different conclusion. If this charge proceeds to disposition by an ALJ 
with or without a hearing, and if that disposition is adverse to the City, the question as 
to whether the charge should have been reopened can be raised to us by the City on 
appeal from that decision. As the issue is preserved for eventual appeal by the City, its 
interests are protected and permission for interlocutory appeal is not warranted. 
5See Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB 1J3050 (1996), where the interlocutory 
appeal from the Director's decision to reopen an improper practice charge that had 
been deemed withdrawn was denied. 
6Id.; Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, supra (ruling denying elimination 
of certain allegations in a charge); Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3006 
(1995) (notice of claim); Mt. Morris Cent. Sch. Dist., supra (reopening of conditionally 
dismissed charge); State of New York (State Inc. Fund) (Culkin), 25 PERB 
1J3063 (1992) (timeliness). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the City's motion is denied. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DANIEL M. MANKOWSKI, 
Charging Party7 — 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-21512 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
DANIEL M. MANKOWSKI, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Daniel M. Mankowski to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his improper practice charge. The charge, sworn to February 23, 2000, 
alleged, inter alia, that the Public Employees Federation (PEF) violated §209-a.2(c) of 
the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to afford him proper 
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representation. Mankowski's former employer, the State of New York (State), is made 
a party to this proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act.1 
FACTS 
On February 23, 2000, Mankowski filed an improper practice charge alleging 
PEF-failed-to faiply peppesent-him in-eertain-gpievanGes thathpemain outstanding sinee-his 
retirement from the State in 1990. Mankowski relies upon those unresolved grievances 
as the basis for the instant charge against PEF.2 
On March 1, 2000, the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) informed Mankowski that his charge was deficient 
because it had not been filed within four months of any conduct attributable to PEF. 
Mankowski's letter of March 7, 2000 in answer to the Assistant Director's letter was 
unresponsive to the deficiency notice. 
1Section 209-a.3 of the Act provides that: 
[TJhe public employer shall be made a party to any charge 
filed under [§209-a.2] which alleges that the duly recognized 
or certified employee organization breached its duty of fair 
representation in the processing of or failure to process a 
claim that the public employer has breached its agreement 
with such employee organization. 
2The charge references a prior improper practice charge filed by Mankowski 
against PEF which was dismissed. The instant charge incorrectly characterizes the 
rationale behind the dismissal. It is significant to note that the ALJ found that 
Mankowski had been represented by an attorney regarding the grievances and that 
attorney had been involved in settlement discussions with PEF representatives. Public 
Employees Fed'n, 27 PERB H4642 at 4937 (1994). 
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On March 17, 2000, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the charge as untimely. We agree. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) mandates that 
improper practice charges-be filed within four months of the date of the conduct-which 
is the subject of the charge. While the Rules pertaining to the filing of exceptions to the 
decisions by the Director and Administrative Law Judges provide for extensions of time 
because of extraordinary circumstances (§213.4),3 the Rules do not provide for any 
extension of time to file an improper practice charge. 
The Assistant Director's letter of March 1, 2000 informed Mankowski that the 
deficiency was the untimeliness of the charge. It was filed on February 23, 2000, more 
than four months after Mankowski's last contact with PEF on April 17, 1998. Any 
charge Mankowski has against PEF must be measured from this date in order to 
ascertain compliance with the four-month limitation of time set forth in the Rules. 
3New York City Transit Auth., 33 PERB 1J3013 (2000); Auburn Indus. Dev. Auth., 
15 PERB 1J3075 (1982). For other cases discussing attempts to toll the four-month 
limitation of time, see New York City Transit Auth. (Dye), 30 PERB 1J3032 (1997) 
(allegations of misconduct of Transit Authority more than four months after disciplinary 
hearing); State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 22 PERB 
1J3009 (1989) (four-month limitation in Rules runs from the date the adverse action took 
piace and not from the date when improper motivation is ascribed to \\);Board of Educ. 
of the CitySch. Dist.ofthe City of New York, 19 PERB fl3066 (1986) (exhaustion of 
administrative review proceedings); Transit Workers Union, Local 100 (Connolly), 
28 PERB 1J4678 (1995) (attempts to resolve dispute through internal union procedure 
rejected); Public Employees Fed'n (Reese), 26 PERB 1J4589 (1993) (illness preventing 
timely filing rejected); Port Jefferson Teachers Ass'n (Handler), 20 PERB 1J4508 (1987) 
(charge alleging union's negligence prevented timely filing rejected). 
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Based on the foregoing, Mankowski's exception in the form of an appeal is 
denied and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED:^June^21^2GO0 
Buffalo, New York 
O 
) 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
"7 arc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4970 
TOWN OF SHANDAKEN, 
Employer. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (MARY M. ROACH of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 12, 2000, the United Federation of Police Officers, Inc. 
(petitioner), filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Town of Shandaken (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they 
stipulated that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Full-time and part-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
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Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on May 10, 
2000, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the 
petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the 
eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the 
purpose of collective bargaining by the petitioner, !T !S ORDERED that the 
petition should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 21,2000 
Albany, New York 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
MANAGERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner^ — 
-and- CASE NO. C-4609 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM, 
Employer, 
-and-
SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF PUTNAM, 
Intervenor. 
GERALD P. BUTLER, JR., for Petitioner 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER & DROHAN (JOHN M. DONOGHUE 
and STUART S. WAXMAN of counsel), for Employer 
SHERIFF ROBERT THOUBORRON, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 21, 1996, the Putnam County Sheriffs Office Managers 
Association (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the County of Putnam (employer). 
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Pursuant to this Board's decision dated January 24, 2000, a secret-ballot 
election was held in the following unit on April 26, 2000. 
Included: Road patrol, corrections and communications captains and 
corrections lieutenants. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
A majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
//A a -
/ ^ MarcVA. Xbrjott, Member 
bhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petiti one r, 7 
-and- CASE NO. C-4928 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
1 
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Included: All employees of the County, except as listed below. 
Excluded: Seasonal employees, elected and appointed officials, heads of 
departments, deputy department heads, all confidential secretaries, 
all attorneys and the titles set forth in the attached Appendix A, as 
well as employees of the Sheriffs Department, and all other 
em p I oyees - - ' - _— 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
MichaeLR. Cuevas, Chairman 
S Marc A. Abbott, Member 
'John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PARAPROFESSIONALS FOR A DEMOCRATIC 
UNION, NYSUT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4957 
ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
ROCHESTER ASSOCIATION OF 
PARAPROFESSIONALS, 
\ Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding1' having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Rochester Association of Paraprofessionals 
-The petitioner sought to decertify the intervenor and be certified as the 
negotiating representative. 
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has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances: 
.Included: All parapxofessionals_included in the unit determination datedJVIayL9, 
1969. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Rochester Association of Paraprofessionals. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
fare A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ULSTER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4973 
COUNTY OF ULSTER and ULSTER COUNTY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ulster County Community College Faculty 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and adjunct/part-time faculty at the Ulster County 
Community College. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Ulster County Community College Faculty Association. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ 
/A 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200B, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4977 
CENTRAL SQUARE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees International Union, 
Local 200B, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: School Monitors. 
Excluded: Substitute School Monitors and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectivjalyj^ 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION OF 
NEW YORK STATE/GERMANTOWN 
ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, '_
 : ._ . 
-and- CASE NO. C-4978 
GERMANTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION, 
\ Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School Administrators Association of New 
York State/Germantown Administrators Association has been designated and selected 
1
 All parties agree that the Administrative Supervisory Association is defunct. 
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by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Director of Guidance, High School Principal and Elementary 
Principal. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the School Administrators Association of New York 
State/Germantown Administrators Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BINGHAMTON TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION - TEACHING 
ASSISTANT UNIT, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4982 
BINGHAMTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Binghamton Teachers Association -
Teaching Assistant Unit, NEA/NY, has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: Licensed Teaching Assistants. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Binghamton Teachers' Association - Teaching Assistant 
Unit, NEA/NY. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 2000 
Buffalo, New York 
''1st 
O/^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
//// I /) A 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
